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Abstract 
This article analyses when illegality is considered as an exception to the principle of 
autonomy in documentary letters of credit. It develops a model for illegality exception 
under English law based on doctrinal study, policy reasons, identified pragmatic problems 
and expectations of the international business community.  The second part of this article 
argues that it is time for the UCP to nudge national laws toward appropriate outcomes for 
fraud and illegality exceptions and develops a model based on Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory, Rational Choice Theory and Nudge Theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
The principle of autonomy in documentary letters of credit (LC), namely, the independence 
of LC from the underlying transactions and goods, plays a pivotal role in enhancing 
confidence in an uncertain and volatile international trade environment.1 Illegal activities 
have intensified recently due to the COVID pandemic and perpetrators may well hide 
behind the principle of autonomy to commit illegal activities.2 It is therefore a thorny task 
to protect the principle of autonomy from being infringed by disputes in the underlying 
supply contract, while at the same time not allowing perpetrators to hide behind the 
principle of autonomy to commit illegal activities. The first part of this article proposes a 
model that (1) clarifies when illegality can infringe the principle of autonomy; (2) analyses 
policy reasons pro and against illegality exception and (3) suggests the qualifications that 
should be required under English law to allow illegality to infringe the principle of 
autonomy. The analysis will be based on doctrinal study, identified pragmatic problems 
and expectations of the international business community. The second part of this article 
argues that it is time for the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
to nudge national laws toward appropriate outcomes as to the fraud and illegality 
1 B Demir & B Javorcik, ‘Trade finance matters: evidence from the COVID-19 crisis’ [2020]  Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7499719/ accessed 02/12/2020: their study 
evidences that exports reliant upon  LC as a means of payment and finance have proven to be significantly 
more resilient to the COVID pandemic than exports reliant upon payment by either open bank account or cash 
in advance.   
2 PwC’s Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2020, 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html  accessed 02/12/2020; Europol 
Report,  How Criminals Profit From The Covid-19 Pandemic (March 2020) 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/how-criminals-profit-covid-19-pandemic accessed 
02/12/2020; M Musumeci & F Marelli , ‘How organized crime is expanding during the COVID-19 crisis’ (Geneva, 
June 2020) http://www.unicri.it/index.php/news/how-organized-crime-expanding-during-covid-19-crisis 
accssed 02/12/2020; Experian Report, ‘Fraud rate rises 33% during Covid-19 lockdown’ (June 2020) 
https://www.experianplc.com/media/news/2020/fraud-rate-rises-33-during-covid-19-lockdown/  
Author Accepted Manuscript: Hwaidi, M 2021, 'Letters of Credit: Model for the Illegality 
Exception and for the UCP to Address Exceptions to the Principle of Autonomy', Journal of 
Banking and Finance Law and Practice, vol. 32, pp. 26-42.
exceptions. It proposes a model on how the UCP should address illegality and fraud 
exceptions based on Cognitive Dissonance Theory,3 Rational Choice Theory4 and Nudge 
Theory.5 
 
The principles of autonomy and strict compliance in LC provide exporters and importers 
with a means of security that mitigates the risk of the lack of confidence that exporters 
may not be paid after the shipment of goods to another country and the risk that importers 
may not receive conforming goods after they make payment.6 It is essential therefore to 
continue to vehemently safeguard the principle of autonomy, namely, the independence 
of the LC from both the underlying contract7 and the physical status of the goods.8 So 
banks should pay against only one condition, which is the presentation of documents by 
the beneficiary of the LC, that appear to be in compliance with the terms of the LC and 
the bank should not involve or be influenced by the actual physical status of goods and 
disputes between importers and exporters.9  
 
But illegal trade activities have nearly doubled in the first half of 2020 in comparison to 
2019,10 due to COVID 19, and the economy of the UK alone has suffered loss of £38 billion 
as a result of deceit for financial profit.11  Supply chain is particularly vulnerable to illegal 
activities, because of its global reach involving different transactions (sale, custom 
clearance, insurance, carriage) and parties as well as various government rules under 
different jurisdictions. The negative impact of pandemics on the global economy12 
seemingly amplify the criminal motive of desperate traders to commit illegal activities.13 
The recent collapse in 2020 of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd, one of the largest oil traders 
in East Asia, illustrates how the founder and other employees used letters of credit, based 
                                                        
3 L Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press, 1957). 
4 J Scott, Rational choice theory: Understanding Contemporary Society Theories of The Present (G Browning, A 
Halcli & F Webster ed, Sage Publications 2000); Rational Choice Theory is applied in criminology see R Clarke, 
Situational Crime Prevention: A safer society – Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (Crime and Justice 
homepage, The University of Chicago Press Journals Division 1995, v.19, p.91). 
5 R Thaler & S Cass, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. (2009, New York: 
Penguin).   
6 F Youssef, ‘Documentary Risk In Commodity Trade’, consultancy paper to UNCTAD 
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/itcdcommisc31_en.pdf accessed 02/12/2020; P Elinger and 
D Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit, 1st edn (Hart, 2010) chapter 1;M Hwaidi, ‘An 
Evaluation Of The Efficacy Of Ucp 600 Within English And Jordanian Legal Orders And Jordanian Commercial 
Practices’, PhD thesis submitted to Nottingham Trent University 
http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/32495/1/MHwaidi%20PhD%20final%20after%20amendments.pdf accessed 
02/12/2020.  
7 Article 4 UCP 600; United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168.  
8 Article 5 UCP 600; United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 183.  
9 Article 14 (a) of UCP 600; Collected Opinions 1995-2001, R.405: banks should not investigate the authority 
under which a specific document was issued; Westpac Banking Corpn v South Carolina national Bank [1986] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 311, 315.  
10 S Meadows, ‘Covid-19 scams mean fraud cases nearly doubled in first half of year’ the telegraph (16 Sep 
2020) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/09/15/covid-19-scams-mean-fraud-cases-nearly-doubled-first-
half-year/ accessed 02/12/2020.    
11 national Fraud Authority - annual fraud indicators January 2011; UK Government Guidance ‘Crime and fraud 
prevention for businesses in international trade’ (2020) https://www.gov.uk/guidance/crime-and-fraud-
prevention-for-businesses-in-international-
trade#:~:text=It%20is%20estimated%20that%20every,sophisticated%20and%20harder%20to%20detect 
accessed 02/12/2020; according to PwC Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2020, 47% of respondents 
experienced fraud in the last two years https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/forensics/economic-crime-
survey.html  accessed 02/12/2020.  
12 UNCTAD, Global Trade Update October 2020 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-
document/ditcinf2020d4_en.pdf accessed 02/12/2020. 
13 As crimes in international trade tend to be professional crime and perpetrators calculate the benefits and 
costs based on Rational Choice Theory: see below under the heading ‘Model to The Exceptions of The Principle 
of Autonomy in The UCP’.  
on a sham underlying sale contract, as a facility to illegally raise finance.14 It is time 
therefore for the UCP to recognise illegality and fraud as potential exceptions to the 
principle of autonomy in order to protect the integrity of LC, but in a way that will also 
ensure the protection of the principle of autonomy from being broadly infringed. Such an 
initiative is an essential part of the strategy to manage supply chain security.15 
 
The first part in this article proposes a model of the illegality exception under English law 
as English law has not yet developed doctrines and rules for such an exception. The 
literature lacks an in-depth account of what the essential requirements should be for the 
illegality exception under English law.16 Whilst English law proves to be protective to the 
principle of autonomy, some other national laws recognise exceptions in addition to fraud 
and illegality, such as unconscionability and nullity regarding demand bonds and standby 
letters of credit. Some lawyers wrongly mingle LC with demand bonds or standby letters 
of credit when it comes to the exceptions of the principle of autonomy.17  That is evaluated 
in the second part of the article. It is another reason why the UCP should act, before it is 
too late, to nudge national laws to protect the principle of autonomy from being broadly 
infringed and to preserve the integrity of LC by addressing fraud and illegality exceptions 
in a time that an international instrument such as the UCP is most needed to help 
management of supply chain security. The second part of this article therefore proposes a 
model for the illegality and fraud exceptions in the UCP.     
   
 
1: Model For Illegality Exception Under English LAW  
A. Division of illegality according to where it occurs in the legal relationships 
in LC under national laws (part A of the model) 
                                                        





accessed 02/12/2020;  J Jaganathan ‘RPT-Founder of oil trader Hin Leong, OK Lim, charged in Singapore court 
in forgery case’ Reuters (17 Aug 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/singapore-oil-hin-leong-
idUSL4N2FI0RF.  
15 As a strategic response to prevent crime see J Ahokas and others, ‘A conceptual model for crime prevention 
in Supply Chain management’ (17th International Annual EurOMA Conference, Porto, Portugal Jun 2010) 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282846220_A_conceptual_model_for_crime_prevention_in_Supply_
Chain_management accessed 02/11/2020.  
16 E,g. Enonchong does not analyse the type of serious illegality that is required to infringe the principle of 
autonomy: N Enonchong, The Independence Principle of Letters of Credits And Demand Guarantees, 1edn 
(2013, OUP); Malek and Quest only addresses the United City Merchant case regarding unenforceability: A 
Malek and D Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, 4th edn (Tottel, 2009); see also P Elinger and D Neo, The Law 
and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit, 1st edn (Hart, 2010); J Chuah, ‘Documentary credits: letter 
of credit - underlying transaction illegal’ [2003] Journal of International Maritime Law 9(6), 518-521 - non of 
the aforementioned invaluable works distinguish that the United City Merchants is an example whereby LC is a 
facility furthering an illegal act so restraining payment does not infringe the principle of autonomy, see below 
under the heading ‘Illegality in the documentary credit itself between bank and beneficiary’. Requirements for 
illegality exception are not analysed but they are merely criticised of being broadly flexible and demand bonds 
are not distinguished from LC, an example of that is the work of M Kelly-Louw ‘The Comparative and 
international law journal of southern Africa’, [2009] Vol.42 (3), p.339-386. Criminal illegality is analysed in 
detail and it is argued as a basis for illegality exception in USA: G McLaughlin, Letters of credit and illegal 
contracts: the limits of the independence principle, [1988] 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1197 Banking and Finance Law 
Review 479.  
17 Allen & Overy, Covid-19 coronavirus update: 7 key points for making sure your standby letter of credit is still 
as good as cash, (19 Apr 2020 Allen & Overy) https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-
insights/publications/covid-19-coronavirus-update-making-sure-your-standby-letter-of-credit-is-still-as-good-
as-cash accessed 01/12/2020; M Kelly-Louw ‘The Comparative and international law journal of southern 
Africa’, [2009] Vol.42 (3), p.339-386.   
 
The LC is independent from the underlying contract18  and the operating contracts (i.e. 
contract between banks and contract between bank and applicant in LC)19 and the bank 
should only examine the documents on their face and not the actual physical status of the 
goods.20 This is the commercial and conceptual understanding of the principle of autonomy 
in LC. Based on that understanding, in order to determine whether the claim for illegality 
is a claim to breach the principle of autonomy illegality under national laws should be 
divided into the following categories. (1) Illegality in LC itself between bank and 
beneficiary. It is analysed in this section below that such a claim of illegality does not 
require the principle of autonomy to be set aside and, as the general principles of illegality 
apply, the bank is prohibited from honouring LC when there is a supervening illegality or 
whereby the LC is set up as a facility to further an illegal act. (2) Illegality in one of the 
operative contracts in LC. Under this claim of illegality the principle of autonomy should 
not be infringed pursuant to the principles of illegality under common law as explained 
below. (3) Illegality in the underlying contract of LC. It is analysed below in this section 
‘part A of the model’ how such a claim of illegality breaches the principle of autonomy, 
what are the practical difficulties of allowing such a claim and what is the current position 
of English law. In ‘part B of the model’ I propose that the claim of illegality in category 3 
should fulfil certain requirements that are informed by moral and rational justifications in 
order to be permitted to infringe the principle of autonomy under English law.   
 
 
(1) Illegality in the LC itself between bank and beneficiary 
 
For illegality in the LC contract between the issuing, or conforming, bank and the 
beneficiary, the general illegality principles of law apply. The principle of autonomy is not 
engaged and thus no real difficulty would arise. A clear example is where the issuing of 
the credit is prohibited as the beneficiary is from an enemy country. Another example is 
supervening illegality where the issuing of the credit is lawful but at the time of honouring 
the credit it has become illegal to honour the credit because the beneficiary is from a 
country that has become an enemy to the bank’s country or due to a governmental order.21 
An examination of documents and honouring the LC may be impossible to be legally 
performed during COVID 19 due to a government lockdown. If the LC is expired during 
the lockdown the bank will be discharged from its undertaking to honour the LC, based on 
the doctrine of frustration (i.e. unforeseen event beyond the control of parties renders the 
performance impossible) under common law.22 Article 36 of UCP 600 is not helpful for 
beneficiaries who could not, during LC period, present documents due to COVID 19 
restrictions, as it excuses the bank from honouring or negotiating during the lockdown and 
even after resuming to business if by that time the LC is expired. Some lawyers correctly 
                                                        
18 Article 4 UCP 600. 
19 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [1983] 1 AC 168, 
182- 183 per Lord Diplock; Hamzeh Malas & Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd. [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, 129 per 
Jenkins LJ. 
20 Article 5, sub article 14 (a) and article 34 UCP 600; GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank Plc (1985) 30 B.L.R. 
48, 63 Parker LJ; Consolidated Oil Ltd v American Express Bank Ltd [2002] C.L.C. 488, 495; Montrod Ltd v 
Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH & Anor [2002] C.L.C. 499 [59].   
21 After the ending of Iraqi regime in 2003 the Jordanian government ordered banks in Jordan to restrain 
payments of letters of credit to Iraqi beneficiaries as many credits involved transactions for the previous Iraqi 
government.  
22 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, 33 edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 2020).  
suggest that UCP 600 should have a provision similar to art e6e(i) and e12 of eUCP 600 
that extends the period of the LC after the resumption to business.23 
 
The second type is where the LC is set up by the beneficiary as a facility to ‘further an 
illegal act’. This might occur in practice where a documentary credit is a facility to achieve 
money laundering, disguised money exchanging, defrauding creditors, abusing tax or 
revenue regulations or commercial bribery. An example of that is United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada.24 The price of the underlying contract was 
artificially doubled to enable the buyer, Peruvian company, to exchange Peruvian currency 
for the artificially increased contract price and thereby avoid Peruvian exchange control 
regulations. The seller would receive the doubled price via LC and would keep the real 
price and would then transfer the artificially increased price to the branch of the buyer 
which is based outside Peru.   
 
It was held by the House of Lords that the LC payment was enforceable to the extent that 
it represented the true price of the sale contract. Since it was not difficult to identify the 
monetary transaction that sought to be concealed by the actual words of both the 
documentary credit and the sale contract, only that part of the payment in the 
documentary credit that related to the monetary transaction was unenforceable. 25  
 
Although the policy that a court must not lend its aid to enforce the contract that is 
unenforceable by law was applicable, and thus the court must take the point itself, there 
was no illegality since the statute that had been breached was a non-UK statute and the 
effect of such a breach, pursuant to article VIIII (2) (b) of Bretton Wood Agreement, was 
to treat the transgressed act as unenforceable and nothing more.26 Since the documentary 
credit was a facility to conceal the breach of the exchange control regulation the principle 
of autonomy was not engaged because the documentary credit contract was itself violating 
the legislation,27 although it was not the payment of the money per se that was 
unenforceable but only the inflation of the contract price in the underlying contract. 
 
  
(2) Illegality in one of the other operative contracts of the documentary 
credit  
 
Illegality in one of the other operative contracts might occur in practice where the LC 
contract of the issuing bank with the applicant, or the indemnity contract with the 
confirming bank, becomes illegal if the countries of the parties issue orders or enact laws 
prohibiting trading with each other (supervening illegality). There is no direct authority 
under English law regarding this issue. Under the general illegality principles of English 
law the LC contract with the confirming bank would be enforced as the beneficiary would 
not base its claim on the illegal contract between the issuing bank and the confirming 
bank.28  
 
(3) Illegality in the underlying contract 
                                                        
23 E LI, ‘COVID-19: its impact on letters of credit’ Stephenson Harwood (29 April 2020).  
24 [1983] AC 168. 
25 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 190-91 per Lord Diplock.  
26 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 189 per Lord Diplock.  
27 N Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] L.M.C.L.Q, 406-407.  
28 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 343. 
 
The principle of autonomy implies that illegality in the underlying contract ought not to 
affect the LC contract between the issuing, or confirming, bank and the beneficiary. In 
that event, the beneficiary’s payment right would be secure notwithstanding such illegality. 
Can this implication from the principle of autonomy be sustained even where the cause of 
illegality is a serious crime such as a sale of heroin29 or a supply of arms to an enemy?30 
The answer must surely be in the negative. This is because the payment through the LC 
is actually the consideration (payment of the price) in the underlying illegal supply 
contract. This means the payment in LC assists the realisation of the underlying illegal 
contract (although it is not a facility to further an illegal act – unlike the situation above 
as in the case of United City Merchants31), and such actions have been made illegal as 
they have the potential to cause grave harm to society. 
 
It is therefore essential that national laws ensure high protection for society against such 
harm. The need for such protection needs to overrule other norms such as the principle of 
autonomy (despite that this principle makes LC a secure means of payment). Conversely, 
should the autonomy principle always be relegated below the illegality norms whatever – 
and however minor – the illegality in the underlying contract? For instance should the 
principle of autonomy be laid aside simply because the beneficiary in the performance of 
the underlying C.I.F. sale contract breaches the law by sending goods on an unlicensed 
means of transport, or the quantity of goods to be imported exceeds the maximum amount 
permitted in the applicant’s country, or where the applicant, unbeknown to the beneficiary, 
had not procured the requisite importation licence?   
 
In order to address the inquiry, I will describe below the current position of English law. I 
will then propose part B of the model for the illegality exception which will be applicable 
to English law.    
 
The current position of English Law and in literature 
 
English judicial opinions support the view that illegality whether criminal or civil, that has 
the effect of rendering the underlying contract as being prohibited,32 is an exception to the 
autonomy principle where it taints LC .33 Staughton LJ in Group Josi Re v Walbrook 
Insurance Co Ltd34 provided the reliance test (i.e. the performance of letter of credit would 
be illegal if the beneficiary in the letter of credit would rely, or found its action, on the 
illegal contract to draw on the credit) to determine the degree of connection that permits 
illegality in the underlying contract to interfere with the autonomy principle.35 Such a test 
was later challenged by Cook J in Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2)36 where he 
provided an alternative test for a sufficient connection in that the credit must be set up in 
the beginning as an integral part of the illegal scheme.37  
 
                                                        
29 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.1) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm). 
30 As suggested by Staughton LJ in Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163.  
31 Under the heading ‘illegality in the LC contract between the bank and the beneficiary’ 
32 B Harris, The EC REACH Regulation and contractual supply obligations, [2010] J.B.L. (5), 394, 407-411. 
33 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163; Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank 
(No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
34 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163.  
35 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163. 
36 [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
37 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
Professor Enonchong has suggested, quite rightly, that the enquiry should not be to 
establish the degree of connection between the illegality of the underlying contract and 
the documentary credit but rather to establish the degree of knowledge on the part of the 
beneficiary.38 Being the payment or the reward for an underlying contract, the 
documentary credit is by default an integral part to the underlying contract. Thus, the 
payment of the credit to the guilty beneficiary might simply be considered as a reward for 
his illegal act. The present article builds on that approach and proposes analysis below39 
as to the type of serious illegality and the degree and the time of the beneficiary’s 
knowledge that is required to infringe the autonomy principle since those issues have not 
yet been analysed judicially or by literature.  
 
Nevertheless, the dogmatic view simply rejects illegality as an exception to the principle 
of autonomy in LC due to the potential broad application of illegality. This is the convenient 
view in the USA as illegality has a broad application under both US federal and state laws 
with illegality extending, for example, to penalty clauses.40 This approach interacts with 
the policies underpinning illegality in the sense that it is repugnant to the public conscience 
to enforce payment under a documentary credit for the type of illegality - in the underlying 
contract or operative credit contracts - that is considered as a grave crime such as a sale 
of heroin and the bank might be held criminally liable for the payment of a crime. 
McLaughlin thus argues in the USA for criminal illegality as being capable to infringe the 
autonomy principle.41  
 
B. Moral and rational justifications informing what should be the 
requirements for illegality exception under English law (part B of the 
Model) 
 
We need firstly to appreciate the competing policies and norms (moral and rational 
justifications) of illegality in the context of LC and under English law principles of illegality, 
and that will inform what should be the requirements for illegality exception.  
 
 




Three dominant policies give rise to the law of illegality under the English law, but note 
that the principle of autonomy in LC can be seen as an opposing policy to them.  Firstly, 
respect for the normative effect of mandatory law expressed in the English legal system 
by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty (i.e. if something is forbidden it must not be 
                                                        
38 N Enonchong, The autonomy principle of letters of credit: an illegality exception? [2006] L.M.C.L.Q, 408.  
39 Under the heading below ‘proposal for illegality exception’.  
40 GT McLaughlin, Exploring Boundaries: A Legal and Structural Analysis of the Indepndence Principle of Letter 
of Credit Law, [2002] Banking LJ 521; GT McLaughlin, Letters of credit and illegal contracts: the limits of the 
independence principle, [1988] 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1197.   
41 GT McLaughlin, Exploring Boundaries: A Legal and Structural Analysis of the Indepndence Principle of Letter 
of Credit Law, [2002] Banking LJ 521; GT McLaughlin, Letters of credit and illegal contracts: the limits of the 
independence principle, [1988] 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1197.  
done).42 Secondly, the policy underlying the law of illegality is the protection of public 
interests and morals,43 particularly where an action is criminalised.44  
 
The third is expressed by the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio45 so a person should 
not be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing46 in order to serve the integrity of the 
law pursuant to the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza47so the law should be consistent by 
refusing to give by its right hand what it takes by its left hand.48  
 
In consequence the policies of parliamentary sovereignty, the protection of society as a 
whole and ex turpi causa provide a moral justification for illegality to infringe the principle 
of autonomy in LC. But the application of those policies might, however, be unruly and be 
the cause of uncertainties, which could threaten the stability of transactions and 
undermine the security of documentary credit transactions.  
 
Rational justification for rejecting illegality as an exception  
 
From the perspective of guarding the principle of autonomy, the whole basis of the rational 
justification for the illegality exception is questionable. This is because in the context of 
international trade there is a lack of accessibility (i.e. both the problem of access to laws49 
and the problem of access to information concerning the underlying transaction).  
 
Thus, unlike fraud, there are many different types of illegality and these vary greatly 
internationally even across the legal systems that might operate in the same documentary 
credit transaction. Also in illegality, the confirming bank will face the dilemma of dealing 
with foreign laws in many cases, particularly since illegality often relates to the violation 
of the regulations of the buyer’s country when the confirming bank is operating in the 
seller’s country. 
 
Given the needs for assurance of reimbursement, manageable examination and speed 
banks do not enter documentary credit contracts with the expectation that they will have 
an extra duty to scrutinise both the laws appertaining to the underlying transaction and 
the underlying transaction itself. Because of the growth of statutory law under legal 
systems, trading parties might unintentionally violate laws and even with careful scrutiny 
banks may well not be able to uncover such violations.  
 
                                                        
42 Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] 2 W.L.R. 208; Jordanian Constitution (1952) chapter 5.    
43 The Law Commission (The Law Commission, The Illegality Defence, Consultation Paper 189, para 2.5: 
http://lawcommission.justice.govuk/docs/cp189_Illegality_Defence_Consultation.pdf) identified six rationales 
policy triggering illegality: (1) furthering the purpose of the rule which the claimant’s illegal behaviour has 
infringed; (2) consistency; (3) the need to prevent the claimant profiting from his or her own wrong; (4) 
deterrence; (5) maintaining the integrity of the legal system; and (6) punishment. Except the first rationale the 
Commission did not provide decisive evidence as to the application of other rationales in the context of civil 
illegality.    
44 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (13edn, OUP 2013) para 1.3.1.  
45 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 183 per Lord Diplock; 
Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, [39] per Rix J: it 
was considered as the authoritative source of the implied limitation of the bank’s mandate. 
46 The focus should not be that the claimant is getting something out of wrongdoing but rather is the recovery 
for something which is illegal resulting in inconsistency in the law: Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159, 175-176 per 
McLachlin J; cited with approval; Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 W.L.R. 399, [100] per Lord Toulson.  
47 [2016] 3 W.L.R. 399, [99-101] per Lord Toulson.  
48 Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 W.L.R. 399, [99] per Lord Toulson. 
   
49 Access to law is regarded as one of the eight principles of the rule of law identified by Lord Bingham extra 
judicially: Bingham, The Rule of Law, [2007] The Cambridge Law Journal (66), 76. 
Indeed the problem of the lack of accessibility as to underlying performance and to foreign 
laws generates uncertainties that open the door for unnecessary litigation, and serves to 
encourage traders (acting without good faith, who simply aim to escape from their 
contractual obligations) to raise illegality as a defence to their payment obligation.  
 
The scope of illegality is broad under some jurisdictions (e.g. in the USA penalty clauses 
render the contract illegal) to the effect that permitting any type of illegality to interfere 
with the principle of autonomy might capture many LC  and thus undermine the reputation 
of LC  as being a secure method of payment. Hence, the focal issue is not whether an 
infringement or exception to the autonomy principle is right or wrong in itself, rather the 
issue is the containment of the effects of the exception on the security of LC.  
 
Accordingly, to allow illegality to infringe the principle of autonomy, an illegality exception 
needs to be designed in a way that is responsive to the need of legal systems to safe guard 
society and the competing needs of the banks and traders as to the maintenance of the 
security of LC  taking into account the problem of the lack of accessibility. 
 
Rational justification for accepting illegality as an exception  
 
From the perspective of supply chain security management, the illegality exception to the 
principle of autonomy is rationally justified,  in order to improve the standard of 
‘conveyance security’ (checking authenticity of the materials presented by the parties).50 
So the law which recognises the illegality exception makes the efficacy of ‘conveyance 
security’ standard concrete as the perpetrator will face imminent penalty (i.e. being denied 
the right of payment). Also since the motive of illegal activities, being financial crimes in 
international trade usually committed by sophisticated individuals or groups,51 is to 
enhance the wealth of the capitalist mind and hence it is naturalised in the mind of the 
criminal,52 the element of calculating costs and benefits in the Rational Choice Theory53 is 
the deterministic factor to commit the illegal activity in the mind of the perpetrator. This 
means it is very important that the law makes clear to the perpetrator that he will not 
easily benefit from his illegal activity by hiding behind the principle of autonomy.  
 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that illegality should be accepted to infringe the principle of 
autonomy but in a way that is justifiably narrowed by taking into account the challenges 
identified in the previous heading, particularly in the context of the lack of accessibility 
and the unruly potential broadness of illegality. I propose below the qualifications to justify 
the illegality exception, particularly under the principles of English law.    
 
A proposal for the requirements (qualifications) of illegality exception 
 
                                                        
50 J Ahokas and others, ‘A conceptual model for crime prevention in Supply Chain management’ (17th 
International Annual EurOMA Conference, Porto, Portugal Jun 2010) 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282846220_A_conceptual_model_for_crime_prevention_in_Supply_
Chain_management accessed 02/11/2020.  
51 ‘What is financial crime?’ International Compliance Association (2020)  https://www.int-
comp.org/careers/your-career-in-financial-crime-prevention/what-is-financial-crime/ accessed 02/12/2020.  
52 Based on Bogner theory of crime: A Stichman, ‘Bonger, Willem: Capitalism and Crime: Encyclopedia of 
Criminological Theory’ FT Cullen & P Wilcox ed (2010 SAGE Publications, Inc).  
53  J Scott, Rational choice theory: Understanding Contemporary Society Theories of The Present (G Browning, 
A Halcli & F Webster ed, Sage Publications 2000); Rational Choice Theory is applied in criminology see R 
Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: A safer society – Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (Crime and 
Justice homepage, The University of Chicago Press Journals Division 1995, v.19, p.91). 
To ensure a justified narrowness application of illegality exception it is submitted that five 
qualifications must be fulfilled:  
 
(a) The seriousness of illegality ought to denote either criminal illegality that has the effect 
of prohibiting the contract or civil illegality that has both the effect of prohibiting the 
underlying contract and the element of deceitful wrongdoing; 54 
(b) The knowledge of the beneficiary, but, unlike fraud, the degree and time of such 
knowledge vary; 
(c) The actual knowledge of the bank to the effect that the lack of such knowledge protects 
the right of banks to reimbursement; 
(d) Strong and corroborative evidence at the pre-trial stage, as under fraud, of illegality 
with the knowledge of both the bank55 and the beneficiary.   
(e) Balance of convenience at pre-trial stage.   
 
Types of illegality that should infringe the principle of autonomy in LC  
 
It is submitted that criminal illegality, with the knowledge of the beneficiary and with the 
actual knowledge of the bank as explained below, in the underlying contract which renders 
the consideration, or the promise, of that contract unenforceable or void is the first type 
of illegality that should be permitted to infringe the principle of autonomy.  
 
Of course, an action is criminalised under a legal system for the protection of the whole 
society and for the safeguarding of a state, and the level of the engagement of such policy 
varies according to the severity of the crime as perceived by the state. Clearly punishment 
and deterrence are viable policies for criminal illegality, but ostensibly they have no 
application to civil illegality.56 Also the maxim ex turpi causa emanates from the criminal 
context under English law,57 and it is not generally applicable to civil illegality.58 Being the 
policy triggering the fraud exception under English law the ex turpi causa59 has an 
application in the context of criminal illegality where the beneficiary is guilty of such 
illegality.60 
 
                                                        
54 The element of deliberate wrongdoing being an important factor to apprehend serious illegality as was implied 
in Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
55 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1163 obiter per Staughton LJ.  
56 Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 107, 133-134 per Millett LJ; Tinsley v Milligan [1992] Ch 310, 334 per Ralph Gibson 
LJ; although it was argued by the Law Commission (The Law Commission, The Illegality Defence, Consultation 
Paper 189, par 2.5: http://lawcommission.justice.govuk/docs/cp189_Illegality_Defence_Consultation.pdf) that 
deterrence and punishment were policies underpinning the civil illegality doctrine under English law, the empirical 
findings in their Consultation indicated that just over half of the respondents believed that deterrence is a rational 
policy behind civil illegality and the majority thought that punishment is not a rational policy underlying civil 
illegality.   
57 Beresford v Royal Insurance Company Limited [1938] AC 586, 599 per Lord Atkin.  
58 Except in tort where there is dishonesty: Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts, (31st edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012), para 16.165; under Jordanian law the maxim may operate in dishonesty in the formation of a 
contract: Hadith Narrated by Abul-Hussain Muslim son of Habaj son of al Nishapuri, Sahih Muslim Book 10 
Business Transactions.   
59 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 183.  
60 See above under the heading ‘moral justification’.  
Criminal illegality that renders the contract void or unenforceable involves any criminal 
illegality known by the parties,61 or ought to be known, 62 at the formation of the contract 
under English law. Or a criminal illegality in the performance that renders - under the 
applicable law - the underlying contract void or unenforceable (e.g. lawful sale of coffee 
but the seller in the performance of the contract uses slave workers to produce the coffee). 
 
Where the committed crime in the performance of the underlying contract does not affect 
the validity or the enforceability of the promise, or the consideration, of the contract under 
the applicable law, it entails that the enforceability of the contract does not affect the 
public conscience under that legal regime. Therefore, such criminal illegality should not 
affect the payment obligations in LC. This has the effect of narrowing the scope of criminal 
illegality in a justified pragmatic way that associates public protection to the manifested 
measures by a state.  
 
However, civil illegality in the underlying contract which renders the consideration, or the 
promise, of that contract unenforceable or void so as to prohibit the contract pursuant to 
a statute triggers the principle of parliamentary sovereignty which is a dominant principle 
under English law, and that might explain why English judges in Group Josi and Mahonia 
are of the opinion to accept such illegality to infringe the principle of autonomy. But if such 
civil illegality was truly severe in the sense of affecting the whole society, and thus being 
a supervening norm ousting other norms such as the principle of autonomy in LC, it would 
be criminalised by the parliament. 
 
Hence, deceitful wrongdoing (i.e. the underlying transaction is set up to deceive third 
parties and the letter of credit is used to secure such transaction) is a further qualification 
that should be required, as it was opined per Cook J in Mahonia,63 to civil illegality to give 
effect to the illegality exception, since the ex turpi causa maxim operates under such 
illegality though, unlike fraud exception, is used to prevent deceiving a party privy from 
the LC. 
 
Accordingly, it is submitted that such civil illegality is the second type of illegality that is 
qualified to infringe the principle of autonomy in LC  because: (1) having the effect of 
prohibiting the underlying contract clearly indicates the seriousness of illegality, though it 
is not as severe as criminal illegality, and the intention of the legislation to safeguard the 
state;64 (2) having the element of deceitful wrongdoing triggers the maxim ex turi causa; 
                                                        
61 The contractual parties intend to enter into the contract for an unlawful purpose (e.g. the contract appears to 
be a sale of goods but in reality it aims to defeat the enforcement of exchange control regulation: As claimed by 
the confirming in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168; or an insolvent 
debtor undertakes payment obligations so as to defraud creditors Begbie v Phosphate Sewage Co Ltd (1875) 
L.R. 10 Q.B. 491; Cockshott v Bennett (1788) 2 T.R. 763) or to perform the contract illegally (Apthorp v Neville 
(1907) 23 T.L.R. 575; cf; Stoneleigh Finance Ltd v Phillips [1965] 2 Q.B. 537, 572, 580) or use the lawful subject 
matter of the contract for an upcoming unlawful purpose (e.g. the sale of juices to illegally flavour beer: Langton 
v Hughes (1813) 1 M. & S. 593; cf; Gas Light & Cake Co v Turner (1839) 6 Bing. N.C. 324; Peel, Treitel The Law 
of Contract, (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007) para 11.19.) 
62 Criminal illegality occurs where the term of the contract necessarily involves committing an offence under 
common law (Fores v Johnes (1802) 4 Esp 97), under statute (e.g. infringing food and drug legislation: Langton 
v Hughes (1813) 1 M. & S. 593; Askey v Golden Wine Co [1948] 2 All E.R. 35 or exchange control legislation: 
Bigos v Bousted [1951] 1 All E.R. 92 or the making of  a bribe pursuant to the Bribery Act 2000) or contrary to 
public policy (e.g. trading with an enemy: Ertel Bieber & Co v Rio Tinto Co [1918] AC 260, 273, 289 or deceiving 
public authority: Miller v Karlinski (1945) 62 T.L.R. 85; Napier v national Business Agency [1951] 2 All E.R. 264; 
Beauvale Furnishings Ltd v Chapman [2000] All E.R. (D) 2038). 
63 Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (No.2) [2004] EWHC 1938, 2026 (Comm).  
64 For instance REACH Regulation prohibits substances requiring registration to be placed in the market of EEA 
for the objectives of protecting human health, environmnet and the free movement of goods in a single market: 
B Harris, The EC REACH Regulation and contractual supply obligations, [2010] J.B.L. (5), 394-419.  
(3) the problem of the lack of accessibility can be overcome by requiring the actual 
knowledge of the bank in order to protect the bank from unexpected liability as explained 
below.   
 
Knowledge of the beneficiary and its degree 
 
The knowledge of the beneficiary as to the relevant illegality should be essential under 
English law and it must also be the case under any rational legal system for the following 
reasons. 
 
To infringe the principle of autonomy in LC  for illegality committed in the underlying 
contract without the knowledge of the beneficiary, where the payment of the credit does 
not itself perform an illegal act, is neither morally nor rationally justified.65 The maxim ex 
turpi causa is not applicable in the absence of criminality or dishonesty on the part of the 
beneficiary.  
 
A recognition of such illegality whether or not the documents are nullity, which is 
unbeknown to the beneficiary, as an exception to the autonomy principle would give the 
opportunity to guilty parties to use LC as means to avoid the consequences of their 
wrongdoing. For instance, the buyer who purchases goods knowing they are to be shipped 
illegally without the knowledge of the seller, might then be granted an injunctive relief 
restraining the bank from payment on the basis of illegality. Furthermore, such recognition 
would substantially devastate the security underpinning LC given the potential breadth of 
illegality.  
 
Yet, both the degree of the beneficiary’s knowledge and the level of proof are contingent 
on different types of illegality.  
 
So, under English law, where the underlying contract is ostensibly illegal in the place of 
the beneficiary’s performance, then the knowledge of the beneficiary is presumed.66 If, 
however, such underlying contract does not necessarily involve the commission of an 
offence to the effect that the contract may be performed lawfully, then if it is performed 
illegally by a party other than the beneficiary the actual knowledge (i.e. including a wilful 
of shutting eyes) of the beneficiary of the fact of such illegal performance must be 
proved.67  
 
Where illegality in the formation of the underlying contract is not apparent (i.e. the parties 
entered into an ostensibly lawful contract to achieve an unlawful purpose or to perform 
the contract illegally, for example a lawful sale of medical thermometers for the unlawful 
purpose of the use of heroin), then the beneficiary’s complicity under English law must 
include participation (e.g. producing unusual thermometers that are fit for heroin).68 
Illegality in the performance on the part of the beneficiary requires the knowledge of the 
                                                        
65 See above under the heading ‘competing policies and norms’.    
66 Waugh v Morris (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 202, 208 per Blackburn J. 
The sale of goods that are not legally saleable in the buyer’s country with the knowledge of the seller is a valid 
contract for the seller as long as the seller is not obliged to deliver the goods  to the buyer’s  warehouse: Sumner 
Permain and Company v Webb and Company [1922] 1 K.B. 55.   
67 As under fraud exception: M Hwaidi, ‘Four Uncertainties around the Fraud Exception in Documentary Letters 
of Credit under English Law’ [2018] Journal of International Maritime Law 24, 1, p. 39-56.   
68 Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2012), para 16.011.  
beneficiary as explained above, but if that illegality related to the performance of the part 
of the applicant then the participation of the beneficiary is required.69 
5.4.1  
For illegality in the formation of the contract that is capable of being performed legally on 
the part of the beneficiary, it is submitted that it must be proved that the beneficiary has 
knowledge as to the non-apparent illegality before or at the time when the contractual 
term for the payment by LC in the underlying contract is concluded as it is a proof of the 
beneficiary’s illegal intent at the time of forming the contract. It should not thus be 
sufficient to prove that the beneficiary has knowledge as to the illegality at the time of 
documents presented.  
 
For the issue of illegality in the performance which renders the contract void or 
unenforceable, I suggest  the knowledge of the beneficiary must be proved prior to the 
time of honouring the credit (i.e. once the documents or the draft are accepted for 
negotiation under deferral and acceptance documentary credit). This is because the 
ultimate risk – where all the parties are innocent prior the honour of the credit - must rest 
on the applicant and as such the beneficiary might enter into new contracts creating 
obligations upon himself on the confidence that the payment of the honoured credit would 
be realised.   
 
Actual knowledge of the bank, the time of knowledge and no duty to investigate 
 
Given the problem of the lack of accessibility of illegality as to the underlying contract and 
the represented facts by documents in LC, as analysed above, the main problem in the 
recognition of an illegality exception is the potential exposure of banks to the risk of being 
innocently caught by illegality.  
 
The factual matrix that the bank is not a contracting party to the underlying contract, it is 
not usually an expert in the underlying trade and it needs to determine the conformity of 
documents on their face70 within a short period of five banking days71 justify that the bank 
should not be under a duty to investigate the illegality of the presented documents, or of 
the underlying contract.72 As the bank is not obliged to investigate the fraud in LC  under 
English law,73 it is fortiori that it is not obliged to do so for illegality and that in turn reflects 
the need for speed and manageable examination. Therefore, for illegality to be recognised 
as an exception to the autonomy principle, the “actual knowledge” of the bank is required.  
 
Here it must be proved, by the entity seeking to restrain the paying bank from payment 
on the ground of illegality,74 that there is a wilful shutting of eyes by the bank to credible 
evidence as to illegality and its “effects” under the relevant law. The bank’s knowledge in 
this respect should not include a constructive knowledge based on what a reasonable bank 
should have known and must be established taking into account that the bank is not under 
a duty to make inquiries as to illegality. Only where there is credible evidence presented 
                                                        
69 For analogy: Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co Ltd v A.V Dawson Ltd [1973] 1 W.L.R. 828.  
70 Principle of appearance: article 4 and 14 UCP 600; there is an assumption that the documents are lawful and 
genuine: article 37 UCP 600.   
71 Sub-article 14 (d) UCP 600.  
72 To draw an analogy regarding the lack of accessibility of illegality in a context other than documentary credits: 
Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft v City of London Garages Ltdclose [1971] 1 W.L.R. 149.  
73 Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 617; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab 
Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560; Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v Banque de l'Indochine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 
74 By analougy to fraud: Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1017, 
1030. 
to the bank as to illegality and its general effects under the applicable law, should the bank 
proceed in making inquiries to ensure the reliability of the evidence and the actual effects 
of illegality and the extent of that obligation should be responsive to the individual 
circumstances of the bank.75  
 
The time of the bank’s actual knowledge must be prior to the payment of the credit.76 The 
requirement of actual knowledge should operate as a protective to the bank’s right of 
reimbursement. Therefore where the bank refuses to pay the credit on the basis of mere 
allegation of illegality, without having strong evidence and actual knowledge as to the 
illegality, and it turns out in the judgment that the underlying contract is actually 
prohibited due to illegality with the knowledge of the beneficiary the bank would not be 
liable for refusal of payment. One exception to the actual knowledge is crimes against 
humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court,77 the 
constructive knowledge of the bank should be sufficient as to the effects of such illegality 
under the applicable law, but not as to the factual occurrence of such illegality in the 
underlying contract.      
 
Strong evidence at pre-trial: Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity 
 
The evidence of illegality must be strong at the pre-trial as it can only be fully examined 
at the full trial.78 By parallel the test would be the one that is laid down in Alternative 
Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board and another79 so that on the material 
available the only realistic inference to draw is the illegal intent of the beneficiary and the 
actual knowledge of the bank as to such illegality. It would be very difficult to prove the 
illegal intent of the beneficiary where illegality is not ostensible in the underlying contract. 
Also, it must be proved that credible evidence is presented to the bank as to illegality in 
the underlying contract and facts and its effects. 
 
Balance of convenience 
 
The balance of convenience80 in granting a protective relief (an interlocutory injunction 
and a freezing injunction) pending a full trial of the issues would mainly involve: the 
seriousness of illegality against the stabilisation of the security of payment facilitated by 
LC in international trade and the consequences as to both the breach of the bank’s 
obligations and the negative reputation of the bank as a trusty provider of payments in 
international trade.  
 
                                                        
75 In a different context (trusts) it was said that a wilfully or recklessly failing to make inquiries which an honest 
person would have made constitutes part of actual knowledge: Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437,CA.  
76 By analogy to fraud exception: European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind Bank (No.2) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 642, 
658; United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 560; Credit Agricole Indosuez v 
Generale Bank [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1009, 1015; DCD Factors Plc v Ramada Trading Ltd [2007] EWHC 2820 
(Q.B.), [2008] Bus L.R 654; Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1152, 1161. 
77 Article 7 Rome Statute for International Criminal Court (2011) https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-
library/documents/rs-eng.pdf . 
78 Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 187, 202 per Rix J; 
cited with approval; Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board and another [2015] 1 W.L.R. 697, 
[57].  
79 [2015] 1 W.L.R. 697, [59]. 
80 Section 37 (1) Senior Courts Act 1981; American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396.   
The qualifications that are proposed above would justify in a convenient way an 
interlocutory injunction prohibiting the payment under the documentary credit because of 
illegality. Still, such qualifications ensure a restricted application as to illegality exception.  
 
 
2: Model to The Exceptions of The Principle of Autonomy in 
The UCP  
The UCP and its revisions are issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).81 
Most of LC around the world apply, by the choice of parties, the UCP. National laws have 
been heavily influenced by the UCP as to the rules governing LC.82 There is no revision in 
the UCP and their interpretative aids83 that address the issue of whether illegality and 
fraud can set aside the principle of autonomy in LC. Surely, I argue, this is one area that 
requires the UCP to exercise its power of seduction by nudging national laws towards 




A. Justifications for the UCP to address illegality and fraud 
exceptions  
 
As a justification to the UCP’s current position, it is the ICC’s view that the issue of fraud, 
alike with illegality and enforcement, is the product of the applicable national laws.84 On 
the one hand, it is prudent to appreciate that fraud and illegality have the effects of being 
overriding mandatory doctrines (i.e. they override other legal doctrines and trade usages 
in that the parties cannot contract out of them) and thus an agreement or trade practice 
by the international banking community opposing illegality and fraud exceptions would be 
futile. On the other hand, the UCP can address the exceptions to the principle of autonomy 
in general terms highlighting the practical difficulties and needs of parties to enlighten 
national laws of LC’s peculiar context for illegality and fraud. It will be in an advisory form 
to national laws. So applicable national laws decide whether or not to accept the exceptions 
and also decide detailed rules for the exceptions. Such an approach will not be repugnant 
to mandatory law under the applicable national laws.  
 
Also, it is not prudent to leave the matter open without being addressed at all, given 
COVID 19 illegal activities have increased as explained in the introduction of the article. 
Some traders in international trade barely survive in the market due to substantial 
decrease of global trade, 85 and there has been a lack of workforce to inspect logistic 
                                                        
81 https://iccwbo.org accessed 02/12/2020.  
82 For example, English courts recognise a particular way of interpreting the UCP according to ICC’s way to 
achieve international uniformity Fortis Bank S.A./N.V, Stemcor UK Limited v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] 
EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; Commercial Code of many countries refer to the application of the UCP see for example 
article 341 of Egyptian Commercial Code number 17 year 1999, article 399 of Qatar Commercial Code number 
27 year 2006.  
83 For UCP 600: ICC, International Standard Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under 
Documentary Credits (ISBP), (ICC Publication No. 745, 2013); ICC Opinions.  
84 Opinions 2009-2011, R.744.  
85 Indeed global trade is substantially reduced to 7% according to United Nations International Trade and 
Commodities (UNCTAD) 
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditcinf2020d4_en.pdf.  
procedures thoroughly.86 These circumstances heighten the motive to commit financial 
crime as the motive is no longer merely to increase wealth but it is to avoid harsh 
consequences such as insolvency.  
   
It could be argued as a justification to the current UCP’s position that mentioning 
exceptions to the principle of autonomy in UCP, or its interpretative aids, may raise 
awareness of importers (applicants in LC) to insert such exceptions merely to escape a 
bad bargain rather than being due to a genuine concern.  However, unlike the 20th century, 
this no longer applies as those exceptions are now broadly known to traders and banks.87 
Also deceitful traders and their employees should not take advantage of the principle of 
autonomy by using it as a veil to protect their fraud or illegal activities. The UCP should 
therefore address the possibility of lifting the veil (the principle of autonomy) in order to 
protect the reputation of LC as an honest method of payment and a confident means to 
raise finance. 
 
The last justification to address illegality and fraud exceptions in the UCP is to protect the 
principle of autonomy in LC from being broadly infringed under national laws. For the 
following reasons.   
 
English law has proven to be a protective legal system as to the expectation of 
international traders of having secure means of payment, since there are only two cases 
of fraud where an injunction was granted by English courts and those were in respect of 
demand bonds.88 Of course fraud exception, and the above proposed illegality exception, 
under English law is not illusory as there is a potential to grant injunctive relief.89 However, 
in Canada, Singapore and Malaysia the application of fraud exception is broader than that 
under English law, mainly because the standard of evidence in granting injunctions can be 
less strict than that under English law.90  
 
Jordan is a good example of a developing country under which the fraud exception can be 
functionally applied broadly, although in principle or paper it intends to be narrowly 
applied. In a striking similarity and contrast, Jordanian law (based on Sharia and Civil law) 
and English law share the same policy underlying fraud exception and the rule that the 
beneficiary should have knowledge of the fraud to be restrained from payment in 
documentary credit.91 But, by applying functional comparative study, the outcomes 
between English law and Jordanian law differ.  
 
The Court of Distinction (the highest court in Jordan which interprets the law) in the case 
1215 year 2005 (civil case) stated that fraud with the knowledge of the beneficiary is a 
well-recognised exception to the principle of autonomy in LC. The applicant had requested 
the bank to restrain payment and presented an official report from the port of the arrival 
                                                        
86 A Geschonneck, ‘The Supply chain fraud pandemic’, May [2020] 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/blogs/home/posts/2020/05/supply-chain-fraud-pandemic.html accessed 
02/12/2020.   
87 A Stichman, ‘Bonger, Willem: Capitalism and Crime: Encyclopedia of Criminological Theory’ FT Cullen & P 
Wilcox ed (2010 SAGE Publications, Inc). 
88 Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] Q.B. 84; Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank Plc [1998] C.L.C. 446: in the 
latter case the issue of balance of convenience was not addressed before the court and therefore the case is not 
to be regarded as an authority as to the availability of injunctions in the light of the balance of convenience.  
89 M Hwaidi, ‘Four Uncertainties around the Fraud Exception in Documentary Letters of Credit under English Law’ 
[2018] Journal of International Maritime Law 24, 1, p. 39-56.   
90 C Amafule, ‘The Exceptions To The Principle of Autonomy’, PhD thesis submitted to the University of 
Birmingham; accessed 02/12/2020 < etheses.bham.ac.uk/3831/1/Amaefule12PhD.pd>.  
91 Court of Distinction (Civil), 1215/2005, Alkurtas programme.  
of the goods confirming that the goods were crude waste oil instead of Ethel Lead. The 
bank rejected this request and paid the beneficiary against the presentation of documents 
appeared to be in conformity with the credit. The applicant sued the bank for wrongful 
payment. Neither the Court of Distinction nor the court of appeal investigated whether the 
beneficiary had knowledge of the fraud at or before the time of the presentation of 
documents (that the goods were waste). The Court of Distinction held that the bank was 
not entitled to pay as there was fraud with the knowledge of the beneficiary. Hence the 
court assumed the knowledge of the beneficiary of the fraud. Had this case decided under 
English law, the bank would be entitled to pay unless the evidence presented to it by the 
applicant clearly shows that the beneficiary had knowledge of the fraud.92  
 
The author conducted semi-structured interviews with three Jordanian judges,93 to whom 
usually most LC cases are referred to (i.e. they are to be regarded as representative 
cases).94 It was transpired that many ex parte injunctions restraining payment in LC were 
granted by Jordanian ex part judges.95   
 
The problem under Jordanian law is that the respondent does not have the right to reply 
to the application for an injunction; the respondent only has the right to appeal against 
the injunction after it has been implemented.96 This right to appeal allows the respondent 
to challenge the strength of evidence submitted by the petitioner and the merits in order 
to be taken into account by the court when exercising the discretion upon which it decides 
whether to grant or refuse the requested injunction. The risk that arises where the 
discretion is exercised without the input of the respondent is that a door is thereby opened 
for traders – who wish to restrain payment under LC – to act in bad faith. Traders may 
advance allegations of fraud or ostensible illegality on the part of the respondent that have 
no foundation in fact, in the knowledge that a court will accept those allegations at face 
value. This is a particular issue in the context of allegations of illegality, because of the 
breadth of the illegality concept, and the very significant risk of illegality arising without 
the respondent being party to it, or having any knowledge of it -particularly if it was a 
bank - at the material time. This would threaten the stability of LC as a reliable payment 
mechanism, since genuine payment obligations would be undermined by spurious 
injunctions. 
 
Some authors argue that as unconscionability, which is a very flexible concept under 
common law, is an exception to the autonomy principle in the law of demand bonds in 
Singapore and Australia, it would also be an applicable exception for LC  as they stand on 
the same legal principles.97 Similarly, it is opined that since the abuse of rights, which is a 
                                                        
92 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168; but some may argue that 
such an example refers to the issue of nullity as the goods were waste and the presented documents were 
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94 For the selection of typical cases: Henn, Weinstein and Foard, a Critical Introduction to Social Research, (2 
edn, Sage 2009). 
95 Interviews were conducted in Jordan in 2013 see M Hwaidi, ‘An Evaluation Of The Efficacy Of UCP 600 Within 




96 Article 170 Jordanian Civil Procedures Rules (1988). 
97 C Amafule, ‘The Exceptions To The Principle of Autonomy’, PhD thesis submitted to the University of 
Birmingham; accessed 02/12/2020 <etheses.bham.ac.uk/3831/1/Amaefule12PhD.pd>. 
flexible legal concept based on acting on good faith under Civil law, is an exception to the 
autonomy principle in demand bonds it would also be permitted to restrain the autonomous 
payment in LC.98 Of course the role of documents in demand bonds (pay when I notify) is 
different per se, and far less important than that in LC and this ought to draw a 
fundamental dichotomy between these two facilities.99 The security of payment by LC 
would become vulnerable, if the elastic concepts of unconscionability or the abuse of rights 
would be allowed to impeach the principle of autonomy.  
 
Still, nullity (worthless documents that have no legal effects) is an exception to the 
autonomy principle in Singapore100 and a literal interpretation, without evaluating the 
merits of LC, as to article 5-109 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the USA might lead 
to the same result. In Egyptian law the fraud exception extends to nullity as the knowledge 
of the beneficiary of the fraud is not required.101 Laying the risk of null documents on 
innocent beneficiaries rather than innocent applicants or banks opposes the very nature 
of LC that is an assurance of payment conditional on the conformity of documents on their 
face. LC being an assurance of payment on the conformity of the appearance of documents 
facilitates documentary sales (e.g. C.I.F.) amongst traders and business communities in 
international trade, and laying the risk of null documents on innocent beneficiaries rather 
than innocent applicants or banks would devastate such facility.  
 
According to the above paragraphs, the ICC should take the strategic decision of 
addressing illegality and fraud exceptions in the UCP in order to manage the security of 
LC internationally whilst preserving the integrity of LC and its autonomy. This constitutes 
the first part of the model for the UCP.  
 
B. The theoretical approach for the UCP to address illegality and 
fraud exceptions 
 
This section proposes the second part of the model for the UCP which suggests approaches 
based on Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Rational Choice Theory to prevent illegal 
activities and also on Nudge Theory to influence national laws to choose appropriate 
outcomes.  
 
By applying the theory of Cognitive Dissonance by Festinger102 the revealing of illegality 
and fraud exceptions in the UCP will cause cognitive dissonance to perpetrators. It will 
increase their stress, so they will not be confident to hide behind the principle of autonomy 
to execute their intended illegal act. However, fraud and illegal activities in international 
trade tend to be sophisticated crimes for financial gains, and the motive is to increase 
wealth so is justified as a natural thing to do in the capitalist mind of the criminal.103 
Therefore criminals will try to make their behaviour consistent with the law, so they will 
try to play it well in a way they will calculate the costs and benefits, particularly the 
likelihood of being realistically caught by the current legal rules to decide whether to take 
the risk. The solution for this dilemma is to put criminals in an ambiguous position so they 
                                                        
98 B kzolchyk: Bank Guarantees and Letters of Credit: Time for a return to the fold, accessed 02/12/2020 
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99 M Hwaidi, ‘Four Uncertainties around the Fraud Exception in Documentary Letters of Credit under English Law’ 
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Documentary Letters of Credit, 1st edn (Hart, 2010), 143.   
100 Beam Technologies v Standard Chartered Bank [2003] I SLR 597. 
101 Court of Cassation (Civil) number 621 year 79.  
102 L Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press, 1957).   
103 A Stichman, ‘Bonger, Willem: Capitalism and Crime: Encyclopedia of Criminological Theory’ FT Cullen & P 
Wilcox ed (2010 SAGE Publications, Inc). 
will be dealing with incomplete information to make it more difficult for them to calculate 
the rationality of their decision.104 The UCP should address illegality and fraud exceptions 
without mentioning rules or requirements as to when clearly those exceptions apply. This 
has the potential to prevent illegal activities and enhance, as it will reduce the confidence 
of perpetrators to hide behind the principle of autonomy and it will increase perceived risk, 
complexity and time invested while reducing awards.105 It will therefore assist the 
prevention of illegal activities in letters of credit by making the situation of committing the 
crime more costly. That will in turn enhance the integrity of LC as a method of payment 
and means of finance.  
 
Ahokas Juha and others have developed a conceptual model to prevent crime in supply 
chain which is based on both the theory of total quality management and the theory of 
crime to enhance the management of supply chain security standards such as APEC 
2005.106 In their developed model under the element of Response there should be a 
strategic response to “crime reward decreasing product and process planning” based on 
Rational Choice Theory.107 The initiative of having a UCP provision for the exceptions of 
illegality and fraud is a strategic response as it is based on Rational Choice Theory and 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to prevent crime and to protect the integrity of LC globally 
for reasons explained in the previous paragraph. Such a strategic response by the UCP is 
essential to assist the management of supply chain security, because the proposed position 
of the UCP in the above paragraph is capable to nudge national laws.108  
 
By applying Nudge Theory,109 this initiative in the UCP should not appear, or intend, to 
enforce national laws to a particular legal position or to achieve uniform outcomes. It 
should only intend to influence and change the choice architecture of national laws by 
being clothed in an advisory form and the means of flexibility, but yet sufficiently stress 
perpetrators, to suit various national laws. It should though be certain (i.e by providing 
some details) regarding the commercial context of the main pragmatic needs and 
difficulties of illegality and fraud in LC as expected by the international business 
community. This is because a rational national law needs a good reputation in international 
trade in order to be chosen as the applicable law by traders, and it will therefore reflect 
the expectation of the international business community. Due to the proven influence of 
the UCP on national laws,110 addressing illegality and fraud exceptions will encourage 
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more difficult by limiting rationality of choosing to commit crime regardless of the motive of the criminal: M 
Felson & RV Clarke, ‘Opportunity makes the thief: practical theory for crime prevention’ [1998] Police Research 
Series, London https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/default/files/opportunity_makes_the_thief.pdf accessed 
02/12/2020.  
105 E Kleemans, M Soudijn and A Weenink, ‘Situational Crime Prevention and Cross-Border Crime: Situational 
Prevention of Organised Crimes (K Bullock, R Clarke & N Tilley 2010 Willan Publishing).  
106 J Ahokas and others, ‘A conceptual model for crime prevention in Supply Chain management’ (17th 
International Annual EurOMA Conference, Porto, Portugal Jun 2010) 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282846220_A_conceptual_model_for_crime_prevention_in_Supply_
Chain_management accessed 02/11/2020.  
107 J Ahokas and others, ‘A conceptual model for crime prevention in Supply Chain management’ (17th 
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EWCA (Civ) 58, [29]; Commercial Code of many countries refer to the application of the UCP see for example 
national laws to prevent illegality and fraud and to only infringe the principle of autonomy 
in a narrow way that is based on the commercial context and the reality of challenges 
encountered by the LC parties. Empirical study indicates that judges in Jordan are keen to 
deepen their understanding as to the concerns of the actors to LC in relation to illegality.111 
That may also be the position in many developing countries and the UCP should help in 
informing them of such a context. 
  
 
C. Proposed Provision for the UCP  
 
According to the justifications and theoretical approach advised above, it is submitted that 
there is a need to buttress the needs of the LC parties, in the context of fraud and illegality 
exceptions, in the UCP. This is not to say that the purpose is to regulate by the means of 
certainty how illegality and fraud may be operated as exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy. Because such an attempt would be repugnant to most if not all legal systems 
due to the overriding nature of illegality and fraud norms, and it would also make it easier 
for criminals to calculate costs and rewards of crime. Rather, it must be the task of the 
UCP to provide guidance highlighting the policies underpinning LC and the prominent needs 
of the actors of LC in the context of illegality and fraud. Here, flexibility should be the 
reflective means of the documentary credit policies and needs in order to  both ensure the 
adaptability of such UCP guidance across the different range of legal systems and factual 
circumstances and be opaque enough to stress the mind of criminals and make the 
situation of illegal activities in LC more costly. However, as I argued above, the means of 
certainty (providing some details) is necessary to convey the commercial context and 
pragmatic needs and difficulties to reflect the expectation of international business 
community. These tools facilitate the application of the theoretical approaches to address 
the illegality and fraud exceptions constitute the third part in the model for the exceptions 
to the principle of autonomy in the UCP.  
 
It is hoped that an upcoming iteration of the UCP would contain a provision that is similar 
to the following proposed texts: 
 
“The principle of autonomy of documentary credits is fundamental in international finance 
and trade and it must be highly guarded in order to facilitate a secure method of payment 
to beneficiaries and to protect banks reputation and their right to reimbursement. Fraud 
and illegality are idiosyncratic issues that are associated to national laws and are outside 
the scope of the UCP. It is, however, the expectation of international banking community 
that the national laws that recognise fraud and illegality as exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy will take into consideration the following.   
(i). Knowledge of the beneficiary and the bank of the fraud and illegality, and the bank 
should not be under an obligation to investigate whether there is fraud or not.  
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(ii). The type of illegality must be confined to grave crimes, or to an illegal action that is 
regarded as being against the fundamental principles of safeguarding the state. 
(iii). Banks do not have access to foreign laws and to the facts in the underlying contracts, 
they need to examine the documents within a short period of time, they need to 
preserve their reputation and thus they are not obliged to investigate whether there 
is illegality or not.  
(iv). Evidence as to illegality, in the underlying contract, with the knowledge of the 
beneficiary and the actual knowledge of the bank prior to the payment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is hoped the developed model in this article for illegality exception under English law 
will assist courts to recognise illegality exception in letters of credit (LC) in a systematic 
way that ensures both the security of payment and finance via LC and the integrity of LC. 
It is also hoped that the UCP will adopt the model proposed in this article for illegality and 
fraud exceptions to assist the international management of supply chain security by 
nudging national laws towards appropriate outcomes.   
Part A of the model clarifies when the principle of autonomy is engaged for an illegality 
claim in LC. To avoid confusion, a distinction must be drawn between (1) illegality in the 
formation or performance of the LC contract itself between the bank and the beneficiary; 
(2) illegality in one of the operating contracts in documentary credits and; (3) illegality in 
the underlying contract. The principle of autonomy is not engaged in the first two 
categories, so the general principles of the law of illegality apply.  It is argued that illegality 
in the underlying contract whereby the LC  is used as a facility to further an illegal act by 
the beneficiary or with his knowledge, as in the United City Merchants case, belongs to 
the first category so it does not affect the principle of autonomy. It is the claim of illegality 
in the third category that can be said to be a claim for illegality exception, to set aside the 
principle of autonomy.  
The bank faces thorny challenges in deciding whether or not it is obliged to honour the LC 
where there is an alleged illegality in the underlying contract. This is because illegality is 
an unruly area that is much more complex than fraud partly since it often involves the 
violation of laws which are foreign to the confirming bank. There is a lack of accessibility 
as banks lack an access to the law and to the facts of the underlying contract. However, 
the moral and rational justification for the illegality exception is even stronger than that 
of the fraud exception. Part B of the model identifies the policy reasons pro to illegality 
exception (i.e. ex turpi causa and integrity of law, parliament sovereignty, protection of 
society, public conscious, integrity of LC, supply chain security) and against illegality 
exception (i.e. security of payment and finance, reputation of banks as guarantors of 
payment, lack of accessibility, broad application of illegality, speed in checking documents 
and manageable presentation, evidence is not examined fully prior full trial). It then argues 
that illegality exception is justified subject to qualifications that are triggered and informed 
in a balanced way by policy reasons (including pragmatic needs and difficulties in LC 
context) of both pro and against illegality exception. 
These qualifications are: (1) illegality must be confined to criminal and civil illegality in the 
formation of the underlying contract or in the performance of such contract if that illegality 
renders the whole underlying contract unenforceable by the beneficiary, in addition that 
there must be a deceitful wrongdoing by the beneficiary in civil illegality; (2) the 
knowledge of the beneficiary as to the illegality and the degree of such knowledge which 
varies from participation to a presumed knowledge as it is contingent on the form of 
illegality; (3) the actual knowledge of the bank, subject to some preservations, and that 
the bank is not obliged to investigate as to whether there is illegality or not; (4) strong  
evidence as to illegality at pre-trial and (5) balance of convenience in granting an 
injunctive relief at pre-trial by focusing on the seriousness of illegality and consequences 
on parties.   
Finally, in light of COVID 19 and for other justifications the article argues that the UCP 
should address illegality and fraud exceptions. The developed model for the UCP for 
illegality and fraud exceptions consists of three parts. (1) The aim is to take a strategic 
decision to internationally manage the security of LC by safeguarding the principle of 
autonomy and the integrity of LC. Justifications for the aim are analysed in the article, for 
example the recent increase of illegal activities and functional differences between national 
laws, the need of developing legal systems to be further enlightened with the commercial 
context of LC. (2) Approaches to achieve the aim are based on Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory and Rational Choice Theory to prevent illegal activities and also on Nudge Theory 
to influence national laws to choose appropriate outcomes. (3) The means to apply the 
approaches. The means for Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Rational Choice Theory are: 
stressing the mind of potential perpetrators and making committing illegal activities more 
costly. This would be achieved by addressing illegality and fraud exceptions in the UCP 
whilst providing incomplete information to potential perpetrators as to when the 
exceptions apply. For Nudge Theory these means are: (a) UCP provisions should be in an 
advisory form, (b) they should be flexible by avoiding certainty (i.e. no detailed rules) so 
the UCP will not be repugnant to national laws and (c) they should provide certainty in 
conveying the commercial context and pragmatic needs of traders, so the choice architect 
of a national law will understand that context in order to then meet the expectations of 
the international business community and hence that national law will become a preferred 
choice as the applicable law by international traders.  
 
 
 
